Corporate Governance Lab

The Corporate Governance Lab, operated by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Finance, seeks to foster research using quantitative tools – including econometric, statistical, or modeling tools – in the field of corporate governance.

The Faculty Director of the Lab is Professor Alma Cohen.

Corporate governance research studies using quantitative tools by faculty and fellows associated with the Programs include:

The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers

Lucian A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel
Georgetown Law Journal (forthcoming 2019)

Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights

Jesse M. Fried and Holgar Spamann
Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2018-4 (2018)

Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?

Jesse M. Fried and Brian J. Broughman
Harvard Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2018-3 (2018)

The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Tunneling

Jesse M. Fried, Ehud Kamar, and Yishay Yafeh
Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2018-2 (2018)

Financial Markets and the Political Center of Gravity

Mark J. Roe and Travis G. Coan
2(1) Journal of Law, Finance & Accounting (2017), 125-171

Dancing with Activists

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch.
Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2017-7 (2017)

Short-Termism and Shareholder Payouts: Getting Corporate Capital Flows Right

Jesse M. Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2017-3 (2017)

Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value

Alma Cohen and Charles CY Wang
127 Journal of Financial Economics, 637-647 (2017)

The New Look of Deal Protection

Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
69 Stanford Law Review, 1015-1074 (2017)

The Prudent Investor Rule and Market Risk: An Empirical Analysis

Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff
14 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 129-168 (2017)

Socially Responsible Firms

Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog
122 Journal of Financial Economics, 585-606 (2016)

The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure and Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach

Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Business Law Review, 205-236 (2015)

The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang
115 Columbia Law Review, 1085-1156 (2015)

Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value

Martijn Cremers and Allen Ferrell
69 Journal of Finance, 1167-1196 (2014)

Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders

Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
25 Journal of Corporate Finance, 140-154 (2014)

How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
110 Journal of Financial Economics, 627–641 (2013)

Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. and Wei Jiang
39 Journal of Corporation Law, 1-34 (2013)

Learning and the Disappearing Association between Governance and Returns

Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
108 Journal of Financial Economics, 323-348 (2013)

The CEO Pay Slice

Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer
102 Journal of Financial Economics, 199-221 (2011)

Executive Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records

Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
20 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 843-885 (2011)