2002 Symposium on Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation
February 2002
Published in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 733-1270 (2002)
Agenda
Keynote Address
Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, Frank H. Easterbrook
Executive Compensation & Takeovers
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design Of Executive Compensation, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker
Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, Kevin J. Murphy
How I Learned to Stop Worrying And Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock
Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, Jennifer Arlen
Comment: The Best of All Possible Worlds (or Pretty Darn Close), Reinier Kraakman
Corporate Control Transactions
Market Evidence in Corporate Law, Daniel R. Fischel
Commentary on Fischel, Isaac Corre
The Case Against Board Veto In Corporate Takeovers, Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, Martin Lipton
The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging The Conceptual Divide, William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Corporate Speech and Citizenship
Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition For Corporate Charters, Robert H. Sitkoff
Commentary on Sitkoff, Omri Yadlin
Corporate Charitable Giving, Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell
Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell, Richard W. Painter
Closing Remarks
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, Mark J. Roe