2002 Symposium on Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation

February 2002


Published in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 733-1270 (2002)

 

Agenda

Keynote Address

Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, Frank H. Easterbrook

Executive Compensation & Takeovers

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design Of Executive Compensation, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker

Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, Kevin J. Murphy

How I Learned to Stop Worrying And Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock

Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, Jennifer Arlen

Comment: The Best of All Possible Worlds (or Pretty Darn Close), Reinier Kraakman

Corporate Control Transactions

Market Evidence in Corporate Law, Daniel R. Fischel

Commentary on Fischel, Isaac Corre

The Case Against Board Veto In Corporate Takeovers, Lucian Arye Bebchuk

Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, Martin Lipton

The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging The Conceptual Divide, William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Corporate Speech and Citizenship

Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition For Corporate Charters, Robert H. Sitkoff

Commentary on Sitkoff, Omri Yadlin

Corporate Charitable Giving, Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell

Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell, Richard W. Painter

Closing Remarks

What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, Mark J. Roe

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