The Project on Controlling Shareholders, operated by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, seeks to foster research, discourse, and education with respect to controlling shareholders and companies controlled by such shareholders.
Research studies on the subject by faculty and fellows associated with the Programs include:
Controllers Unbound
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel
105 Texas Law Review, (Forthcoming)
How to Control Controller Conflicts
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel
50 Journal of Corporation Law, 1001-1018 (2025)
The Delaware-Inspired Next Step Toward Brazil Becoming the South American Leader in Corporate Law: Making Public Company Arbitrations a Matter of Public Record
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Francisco Ruger Antunes Maciel Mussnich, and Caio Machado Filho
13 American University Business Law Review, 89-122 (2024)
Alibaba: A Case Study of Synthetic Control
Jesse M. Fried and Ehud Kamar
11 Harvard Business Law Review, 279-309 (2021)
Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?
Jesse M. Fried and Brian J. Broughman
10 Harvard Business Law Review, 49-86 (2020)
Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights
Jesse M. Fried and Holgar Spamann
137 Journal of Financial Economics, 353-370 (2020)
The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Tunneling
Jesse M. Fried, Ehud Kamar, and Yishay Yafeh
138 Journal of Financial Economics, 777-788 (2020)
The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel
107 Georgetown Law Journal, 1453-1514 (2019)
Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure
Jesse M. Fried
The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions (Luca Enriques and Tobias H. Tröger (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2019)
The Perils of Dell’s Low-Voting Stock
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel
Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper No. 2018-16 (2018)
The Untenable Case against Perpetual Dual-class Stock
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel
101 Virginia Law Review, 585-631 (2017)
[Reprinted in 59 Corporate Practice Commentator, 759-801 (2018)
Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
165 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1271-1315 (2017)
Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies
Kobi Kastiel
16 Columbia Business Law Review, 61-132 (2016)
Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies
Kobi Kastiel
90 Indiana Law Journal, 1131-1176 (2016)
Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure and Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach
Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
5 Harvard Business Law Review, 205-236 (2015)
The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani
157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1263-1317 (2009)
