The M&A and Corporate Control Project, operated by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Finance, seeks to foster research, discourse, and education with respect to M&A and battles over Corporate Control.
The Research Director of the Project is Professor Lucian Bebchuk.
Research studies on M&A and Corporate Control by faculty and fellows associated with the Programs includes:
For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita
Southern California Law Review (forthcoming, 2021)
Go-Shops Revisited
Guhan Subramanian and Annie Zhao
133 Harvard Law Review, 1215 (2019)
Using the Deal Price for Determining ‘Fair Value’ in Appraisal Proceedings
Guhan Subramanian
The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up? (Steven Davidoff & Randall Thomas (eds.), University of Chicago Press, 2019)
Appraisal After Dell
Guhan Subramanian
The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up? (Steven Davidoff & Randall Thomas (eds.), University of Chicago Press, 2019)
Are M&A Clauses Value Relevant to Bidder and Target Shareholders?
Darius Palia, John C. Coates, IV and Ge Wu
Unpublished work (2018)
The Effect of Prohibiting Deal Protection in M&A: Evidence from the United Kingdom
Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
60 Journal of Law & Economics, 75-113 (2017)
The New Look of Deal Protection
Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
69 Stanford Law Review, 1013-1074 (2017)
Mergers, Acquisitions and Restructuring: Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice
John C. Coates, IV
The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2017)
Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value
Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
125 Journal of Financial Economics, 637-647 (2017)
Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals
John C. Coates, IV
Harvard Law School Olin Discussion Paper No. 889 (2016)
Deal Process Design in Management Buyouts
Guhan Subramanian
130 Harvard Law Review, 590-657 (2016)
M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice
John C. Coates, IV
Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Claire A. Hill (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016)
Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-Making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone
Leo E. Strine, Jr.
70 The Business Lawyer, 679-706 (2015)
Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
25 Journal of Corporate Finance, 140-154 (2014)
Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
114 Columbia Law Review, 1549-1594 (2014)
How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
110 Journal of Financial Economics, 627-641 (2013)
Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Scott Hirst, and June Rhee
3 Harvard Business Law Review, 157-184 (2013)
Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from M&A
John C. Coates IV
2 Harvard Business Law Review, 295-243 (2012)
Bundling and Entrenchment
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Ehud Kamar
123 Harvard Law Review, 1551-1595 (2010)
Is Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988-2008
Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici, and Brian Barbetta
65 The Business Lawyer, 685-752 (2010)
What Matters in Corporate Governance
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell
22 Review of Financial Studies, 783-827 (2009)
The Costs of Entrenched Boards
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
78 Journal of Financial Economics, 409-433 (2005)
Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses
Guhan Subramanian
113 Yale Law Journal, 621-686 (2003)
Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements
Lucian A. Bebchuk
152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 713-753 (2003)
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV, and Guhan Subramanian
55 Stanford Law Review, 885-917 (2002)
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Lucian A. Bebchuk
69 University of Chicago Law Review, 973-1035 (2002)
