Project on M&A and Corporate Control

The M&A and Corporate Control Project, operated by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Finance, seeks to foster research, discourse, and education with respect to M&A and battles over Corporate Control.

The Research Director of the Project is Professor Lucian Bebchuk.

Research studies on M&A and Corporate Control by faculty and fellows associated with the Programs includes:

Using the Deal Price for Determining ‘Fair Value’ in Appraisal Proceedings

Guhan Subramanian
The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up? (Steven Davidoff & Randall Thomas (eds.), University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2019)

Appraisal After Dell

Guhan Subramanian
The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up? (Steven Davidoff & Randall Thomas (eds.), University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2019)

Are Merger Clauses Value Relevant to Bidder and Target Shareholders?

Darius Palia, John C. Coates, IV and Ge Wu
Unpublished work (2018)

The Effect of Prohibiting Deal Protection in M&A: Evidence from the United Kingdom

Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
60 Journal of Law & Economics, 75-113 (2017)

The New Look of Deal Protection

Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian
69 Stanford Law Review, 1013-1074 (2017)

Mergers, Acquisitions and Restructuring: Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice

John C. Coates, IV
The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2017)

Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value

Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
125 Journal of Financial Economics, 637-647 (2017)

Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals

John C. Coates, IV
Harvard Law School Olin Discussion Paper No. 889 (2016)

Deal Process Design in Management Buyouts

Guhan Subramanian
130 Harvard Law Review, 590-657 (2016)

M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice

John C. Coates, IV
Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Claire A. Hill (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016)

Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-Making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone

Leo E. Strine, Jr.
70 The Business Lawyer, 679-706 (2015)

Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders

Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
25 Journal of Corporate Finance, 140-154 (2014)

Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill

Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
114 Columbia Law Review, 1549-1594 (2014)

How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang
110 Journal of Financial Economics, 627-641 (2013)

Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Scott Hirst, and June Rhee
3 Harvard Business Law Review, 157-184 (2013)

Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from M&A

John C. Coates IV
2 Harvard Business Law Review, 295-243 (2012)

Bundling and Entrenchment

Lucian A. Bebchuk and Ehud Kamar
123 Harvard Law Review, 1551-1595 (2010)

Is Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988-2008

Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici, and Brian Barbetta
65 The Business Lawyer, 685-752 (2010)

What Matters in Corporate Governance

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell
22 Review of Financial Studies, 783-827 (2009)

The Costs of Entrenched Boards

Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
78 Journal of Financial Economics, 409-433 (2005)

Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses

Guhan Subramanian
113 Yale Law Journal, 621-686 (2003)

Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements

Lucian A. Bebchuk
152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 713-753 (2003)

The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants

Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV, and Guhan Subramanian
55 Stanford Law Review, 885-917 (2002)

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Lucian A. Bebchuk
69 University of Chicago Law Review, 973-1035 (2002)